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ABSTRACT
In the publishing industry, the publishers
supply products like the magazines,
newspapers and books to the retailers. In order
to encourage the retailers to order more, the
publishers usually adopt a kind of buy-back
return policies under which the retailers can
return the unsold products for a partial refund.
In the past, due to the lack of retail sales
channel, most of the returned products were
salvaged at a very low value. Now, with the
advance of e-commerce, publishers can make
use of Internet as an e-marketplace to sell
those returned products to a completely
different market – the World Wide Web. Since
Internet offers a global open system, it breaks
the geographical barrier and the demand for
those “locally fade-out” goods can be very
significant. In light of this, we study in this
paper a two-echelon supply chain with one
publisher and multiple retailers. Through the
simulation analysis, we find that the impact of
the e-marketplace can be substantial.
Depending on the operations cost of the emarketplace and the size of the demand, the
expected profit improvements for the publisher,
the retailers and the overall supply chain vary.
We identify the factors that can achieve the
situation under which all parties' profits are
improved with the e-marketplace. Moreover,
with a price dependent demand distribution for
the e-marketplace, we can determine the
optimal buy-back price and the optimal emarketplace selling price for the product. A
real case of a local publisher has been chosen
for simulation analysis and the managerial
issues are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
We are now in the information age. With a
continuous decrease in prices of computers and
Internet access services, going online is not a
luxurious activity anymore. With the
popularity of Internet and the growing
confidence about the reliability and security of
the network, e-commerce has a bright future.
Nowadays, companies can contact their

customers and business partners, place orders
and finish transactions anywhere via Internet.
From a supply chain operational perspective, it
is generally believed that Internet can help
improve the supply chain’s efficiency. In fact,
one of the proposal is to use Internet to solve
the channel coordination problem in supply
chain management (e.g. achieving the virtual
vertical integration).
With the practical importance of Internet,
many articles have appeared in recent supply
chain management literature. Let us share and
review some of them now. First, in [8], many
applications of Internet for supply chain
management have been identified. The authors
start the discussion with a review of Internet's
features and its role in the supply chain
management. They mention the issues of
efficient information flow, virtual integration
and strategic gaming among members of the
supply chain. They then discuss the direct sales
and the e-marketplace sales channels via
Internet. For the e-marketplace, they find that
the aggregation of buyers and sellers on the emarketplace can lead to lower transaction costs
and a more efficient market information flow.
It also facilitates B2B transaction. Moreover,
in inventory management, manufacturers can
also buy inventory from other suppliers and
sell the excess capacity or inventory via the emarketplace. Besides e-marketplace, the
applications of auctions and bidding on
Internet with industrial examples and figures
are outlined. In fact, [8] gives us an insightful
overview for many issues which builds the
conceptual framework for further quantitative
analysis of supply chain management with
Internet.
The potential applications of Operations
Research (OR) techniques in the e-marketplace
and Internet enabled supply chain systems are
proposed in [15]. The author has mentioned
the technological issues of the e-marketplace
and the OR opportunities there. In his analysis,
the firm’s planning horizon is separated into
four categories: Long term, medium term,
short term and immediate. For each category,
he describes the corresponding business
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drivers and suggest the possibilities for
applying OR skills to deal with each one of
them. He believes that the supply chains with
Internet and the e-marketplaces can let
companies get additional benefits by using OR.
This paper provides us a lot of information
about how to apply OR methods, together with
Information Technology, for solving real-life
problems.
In the earlier time, the idea of frictionless
competition on Internet is investigated in [1].
The authors have made a comparison between
the conventional retailers and the e-tailers.
They carried out empirical studies towards the
price adjustment and dispersion of the e-tailers
and conventional store retailers of CDs and
books. They conclude by saying that although
internet competition exhibits lower friction,
attributes like branding, trust and awareness
exist and differentiate different e-tailers from
one another. Other interesting e-commerce
related articles for operations management
include [4], [5] and [7].
In this paper, instead of proposing a conceptual
framework, we formulate a quantitative model
and provide a simulation analysis about the use
of e-marketplace for selling returned products
in the publishing industry. We consider a twoechelon supply chain with a single publisher
who supplies the products to multiple retailers.
It is a usual practice in the publishing industry
that the publisher will adopt a buy-back return
policy. Under this buy-back policy, the
retailers can return the excessive orders (i.e.
the unsold products at the end of the season) to
the publisher for a partial refund. This type of
policy with different extensions has been
widely studied in the literature ([2], [3], [6],
[10], [11], [13] and [16]). Notice that the first
well-recognized quantitative analysis of buyback contract appears in the marketing science
literature by Pasternack [13]. Back to the
discussion of the return policy in the
publishing industry, under the original practice,
the publisher uses a buy-back policy to attract
the retailers to order more while the returned
products (from the retailers) usually worth
very little to the publisher (e.g. just the value
of the paper for recycling). Now, with the
advance of e-commerce, we propose that the
publisher can sell the returned products at a
nicer price (higher than the salvage value) on
the e-marketplace. In this paper, we look into
this issue and through simulation analysis, we
first determine the optimal buy-back price in
the absence of the e-marketplace. Then, we
will find the optimal buy-back price and the
optimal selling price of the returned products
in the e-marketplace. After that, we study the
impacts brought by the e-marketplace to the
publisher, the retailers and the overall supply

chain. Numerical analysis is carried out and
managerial insights are then developed.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as
follows: We first propose the basic model and
then we derive the mathematical details for all
the parties in the supply chain. Afterwards, a
real case is studied and simulation analysis for
the supply chain with and without the emarketplace is done. Numerical
analysis
towards the parameters of the e-marketplace is
carried out, too. Finally, we conclude with a
discussion and managerial insights are
developed.
BASIC MODEL
In this paper, we propose a two-echelon supply
chain for a certain publishing business. We
consider a publisher who supplies a single
product to multiple retailers. This product can
be a magazine, a journal or a book, etc. The
normal selling season of this product is short.
For example, for the bi-weekly magazine, its
normal selling season is just about two weeks.
At the end of the selling season, the retailers
can return the unsold products to the publisher
following a buy-back return policy. To be
specific, this return policy states that the
unsold products can be returned to the
publisher for a partial refund with a unit buyback price b. For example, suppose a publisher
sells the products to the retailers with a unit
wholesale price of $100 and set the unit buyback price to be $40. Then after the selling
season, the retailers can return the unsold
products to the publisher and the publisher will
pay $40 for each returned product. In this
paper, we only consider a flat rate of buy-back
price, i.e. the buy-back price is fixed and it
does not depend on the returned and order
quantities. Moreover, owing to the legal issue
of fairness, the unit buy-back price b offered
by the publisher must be the same for all
retailers (see [16]). In the old practice without
the e-marketplace, the publisher would salvage
the returned products at a unit salvage price v.
Now, with Internet, the publisher can consider
selling the returned products with a nicer price
(higher than the salvage price) through Internet.
This is an example of using Internet as a
market place for excess products as mentioned
in [8].
Now, for the product’s cost and revenue
structure, we assume that the product has a
fixed market retail selling price r for all
retailers during the normal selling season.
Examples of this type of products include
magazines, newspapers, journals, standard
priced books, etc with which the publisher sets
a recommended price. For the retailers, the
unit ordering cost of the product from the
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publisher is c. Following the buy-back return
policy, the unsold product can be returned to
the publisher at a unit price b at the end of the
selling season. The unsold product also incurs
a unit holding cost h. In the inventory literature,
the unit holding cost (per unit time period) is
taken to be a product of the unit ordering cost c
and a constant accounting factor I , where
0 < I ≤ 1 . For simplicity, we assume I to be
fixed and every retailer has a unit holding cost
h. For the publisher, the production cost is m
per item. After the retailers have returned the
unsold products, the publisher can sell them to
the salvage market at a unit price of v. Since
the wholesale price of the product is c and the
salvage value is v, the buy-back price under
our consideration lies between them: v ≤ b < c .
Besides salvaging the returned products at a
low salvage value, the publisher can also
consider selling these products in the emarketplace with a unit selling price of r EMP .
Obviously, we have r EMP > v or else it is
unwise to sell through the e-marketplace. By
the way, if the publisher chooses to sell the
returned products through the e-marketplace
and some products cannot be sold finally, it
will incur an additional unit holding cost of
h EMP but it can still be sold to the salvage
market. Moreover, in order to use and establish
the e-marketplace, the publisher needs to pay a
fixed operational cost of C EMP . In this paper,
there are n retailers and 1 publisher (the sole
supplier of the product). During the normal
selling season, the market demand for the
product faced by retailer i is called x i . The
probability density function (pdf) and the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) for x i
are represented by g i ( xi ) and G i ( xi ) ,
respectively. In this paper, these distributions
are assumed to be independent of one another
and we assume them to be normal
distributions, i.e.,

x i ~ N (µ i , σ i2 ) .

(1)
Moreover, we represent the standard normal
pdf and cdf by φ(⋅) and Φ (⋅) , respectively.
The inverse function of Φ (⋅) is denoted by

Φ − 1 (⋅) .
After the normal retail selling season, if the
publisher uses the e-marketplace for selling the
returned products, the corresponding market
demand is called x EMP . Since x EMP obviously
depends on the selling price of the product in
the e-marketplace ( r EMP ), we treat it as a price
dependent variable with the following
structure: When r EMP is well-bounded,

r EMP ≤r EMP ≤ r EMP , the distribution of x EMP is
as follows:
x EMP = − K1 rEMP + K 2 + ε EMP ,
(2)
where K1 , K 2 are positive constants and εEMP
is a random variable distributed as a normal
distribution with zero mean and constant
variance:
2
ε EMP ~ N (0, σ EMP
).

(3)
Notice that the above demand distribution
follows the well-known linear price dependent
demand distribution model in the literature
(see [9]). Observe that the product under our
consideration has a fixed retail price in the
retail market during the normal selling season.
Thus, we do not explicitly formulate a price
dependent demand distribution for the retail
demand x i .
Moreover, notice that in this model, we
assume that the existence of the e-marketplace
for the returned products does not affect the
original retail market. The reasons for that
include:
1. From the time the products are returned
from the retailers to the publisher, it
already takes a relatively long time. For
instance, for a monthly magazine, suppose
it appears in the retail shop on Day 1.
After the normal selling season of a month
(and probably 1 or 2 weeks more), the
retailers will call the publisher to pick up
the unsold magazines. However, the
publisher may only pick them up during
the time when his truck visits the retailer
for new product’s delivery (i.e. at the end
of the month). After picking up and
collecting all the returned products from
the retailers, the publisher can then decide
the other related operations issues for
selling the magazines through the emarketplace. So, in this example, the
returned magazine will be available in the
e-marketplace after two months from Day
1. So, consumers who can buy and want to
buy the magazine during the normal
selling season is unlikely to wait that long
for the magazine.
2. Notice that the purchase of the “fade-out”
products in the e-marketplace incurs an
explicit delivery cost. For the consumers,
they may have to pay the delivery cost of
the products. Thus, the overall expenses
for buying the products through the emarketplace are not necessarily lower than
the retail selling prices of the products
during the normal selling season. In this
case, the shift of the market demand due
to the existence of the e-marketplace for
the returned goods is insignificant.
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3.

The product under our investigation is a
short-life product, most of the consumers
in its retail market are not interested about
it after the normal selling season. For
example, for the weekly fashion magazine,
most of us are only interested in buying
the latest issue and not the old ones.
However, the returned products may have
values to people overseas or people who
cannot buy the products at the first
instance (e.g. due to the geographical
barrier). Since e-marketplace is open to
everywhere, the demand for the product in
a global sense can be substantial.

With all these details, Figure 1 shows the basic
model of the problem. The sequence of the
events in Figure 1 are numbered and they are:
First, the publisher supplies the product to the
retailers. After the normal selling season, the
products leftover are then returned to the
publisher. Next, the publisher sells the returned
product through the e-marketplace (EMP).
After the end of the sales via the e-marketplace
(EMP), any unsold products are salvaged.
Notice that in Figure 1 and the rest of this
paper, EMP stands for the e-marketplace.

p retail ,i ( q retail, i )
= r min( q retail,i , x i ) − cq retail,i
+ (b − h ) max( 0, q retail,i − xi )
= ( r − c) q retail,i
− ( r + h − b ) max( 0 , q retail,i − x i ) , (4)
where the second equality is obtained by using
the
relationship
of
min ( q retail ,i , xretail , i )
= q retail ,i − max (0 , q retail ,i − xretail ,i )

.

Taking

expectation of (4) with respect to x i , the
expected profit becomes,
EPretail , i ( q i )
= ( r − c) q retail,i
− ( r + h − b ) E{max( 0, qretail,i − xi )}
= ( r + h − b ) µi − (c + h − b ) q retail,i
− (r + h − b )σi Ψ[( q retail,i − µi ) / σi ] ,

(5)

where Ψ (⋅) is the right linear loss function for
standard normal and it is defined as follows:
Ψ ( y) =

∫

∞
y

( t − y ) d Φ( t ) .

(6)

On the other hand, for Retailer i with order
quantity q retail ,i , we denote the product leftover at the end of the selling season by
L retail ,i ( q retail ,i ) . The expected product left-over
at the end of the selling season with order
quantity q retail ,i can be derived to be the
following:
EL retail ,i ( q retail , i )
= [ q retail ,i − µi ] + σ i Ψ[( q retail ,i − µi ) / σ i ]. (7)
By checking the second order derivative of
EPretail ,i , we find that EPretail ,i is a concave
function. As a result, the order quantity q *retail ,i

Figure 1: The basic supply chain model with
the e-marketplace.

which maximizes EPretail ,i can be found easily

In the next section, we will present the
mathematical details of the single-publisher
multi-retailer supply chain as shown in Figure
1.

 r−c 
q *retail ,i = µi + σ i Φ −1 
(8)
.
 r +h − b 
Notice that the above result basically follows
the classical newsvendor model. In the
following, we derive the expected profits for
the publisher under the case without and with
the use of the e-marketplace.

MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURES
We first derive the profit expressions for the
retailer and the publisher. Here we have
multiple retailers and we call them Retailers 1,
2, …, n , respectively. We denote order
quantity and the corresponding profit for
Retailer i (i = 1, 2, …, n ) by q retail ,i and
p retail ,i (q retail ,i ) , respectively. When the buyback price b is given, the profit for Retailer i
with order quantity q retail ,i is as shown below:

by solving dEPretail ,i (q i ) / dq i = 0:

Without EMP:
When the publisher does not sell the returned
product on Internet, the expected profit of the
publisher is derived to be:
n

EPPublisher, EMP− = ( c − m )∑ q retail,i .
i =1
n

− (b − v) ∑ EL retail,i ( q retail,i ). (9)
i=1
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n

∑ EL

Notice that

retail , i

( q retail ,i ) represents the

i =1

total expected quantity of returned products
from the retailers back to the publisher. The
publisher's expected profit with the retailers'
optimal order quantities written as a function
*
of b, EPPublisher
, EMP− (b ) , is found by putting (8)
into (9):
n

*
*
EPPublisher
, EMP− (b ) = ( c − m )∑ q retail, i

− (b − v) ∑ EL retail,i ( q *retail,i ). (10)
i=1

With (10), the optimal buy-back price for the
*
publisher (when there is no EMP), bEMP
− , is
*
determined by maximizing EPPublisher
, EMP− (b ) :

(11)

b

Since the buy-back price is bounded between
the salvage value v and the product's wholesale
*
price c, bEMP
− can be found by a simple
numerical search.

With EMP:
Similar to the case without EMP, when the
publisher sells the returned product on Internet,
the publisher’s profit, PPublisher, EMP+ , is derived
to be:
PPublisher, EMP+
n

i =1

i=1

n

+ r EMP min( x EMP , ∑ L retail,i (q retail,i ) )
i=1
n

− (hEMP − v) max( 0 , ∑ Lretail , i ( qretail , i ) − xEMP )
i= 1

Denote:
n

SL =

∑L

retail ,i

( q retail , i ) .

(12)

i =1

Since min(X, Y) = X – max(0, X – Y), we
have:
PPublisher, EMP+
= − (r EMP + h EMP − v) max( 0 , SL − x EMP )
n

+ ( c − m )∑ q retail,i
i =1

+ ( rEMP − b ) SL − C EMP .

n

− (rEMP + hEMP − v) ∫

∑ q retail, i

i =1

0

G(SL) f SL ( SL) dSL

n

+ ( c − m )∑ q retail,i − C EMP ,

(14a)

i =1

SL
[ SL − x EMP ] f N ( xEMP )dxEMP .
−∞

(13)

Taking expectations of (13) w.r.t. SL and
x EMP , we have:

(14b)

In (14a), f SL (SL ) is the probability density
function for SL ; in (14b), f N ( x EMP ) is the
probability density function for x EMP which is
also a normal density. Observe that with EMP,
instead of directly salvaging the returned
products, the publis her acts like a “retailer”
and sells on the e-marketplace and generates
profit. Substituting the optimal Retailer i's
order quantity into (14a) and (14b), we yield
the publisher's expected profit in the following:
*
EPPublisher
, EMP+

= EPPublisher, EMP+ ( q retail , i = q *retail ,i ) .

(15)

With (15), since r EMP and b are both wellbounded in our model formulation, the optimal
*
*
solution pair of r EMP
and bEMP
+ can be found
by numerical searches:
*
*
( r EMP
, bEMP
+)
*
= arg {max EPPublisher
, EMP+ } .

= ( c − m) ∑ q retail,i − b ∑ L retail,i ( q retail,i )

− CEMP .

i =1

G(SL) = ∫

n

n

n

= ( rEMP − b ) ∑ EL retail,i ( q retail,i )

where

i =1

*
*
bEMP
− = arg {max EPPublisher, EMP− (b )} .

EPPublisher, EMP+

(16)

Notice that the expected profit expressions in
(14) and (15) cannot be further simplified. In
general, since we do not have a nice analytical
closed form expression for the distribution of
the total retail returned product quantities SL ,
we do not have a nice closed form expression
*
for EPPublisher
, EMP+ as well. In this case, instead
of seeking for the analytical closed form
solution, we carry out simulation experiments
and get the optimal buy-back and the optimal
e-marketplace selling price for the returned
products numerically.

SIMULATION ANALYSIS – A CASE
STUDY
We carry out in this section a simulation
analysis towards a real case in Hong Kong. A
publisher in Hong Kong publishes a funny
book series with the main themes about some
popular people in Hong Kong, including the
government officials and famous business
merchants. The publisher publishes about 6
funny books a year and they supply the books
to hundreds of major retailers in Hong Kong.
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The sales of the three most recent publications
are 40000, 20000 and 35000 copies,
respectively. The recommended unit retail
selling price of the funny book is HK$25 and it
is reported that the publisher can earn
approximately half of all the revenue. This
publisher has used the buy-back return policy
to entice the retailers to order more. According
to the previous experience, the normal selling
season of each edition of the funny book series
is about 1 to 2 months. After that, the retailers
can return the books to the publisher for partial
refund. Since the retail market is highly
volatile and the overall demand is substantial,
the amount of returned books is not trivial.
(Remarks: The empirical details and some of
the data of this case are found from the
interview of the publisher in a local magazine
[12]).
In light of the background of this publisher, we
would like to formulate a model for the
publisher using the model structure we have
presented in the previous section. From the
information we have (Ref.: [12]), we have
estimated that the current unit production cost
for the book, m, is $4. The unit wholesale price
for the magazine, c, is $16 and the publisher
has marked the recommended unit retail
selling price of the magazine, r, to be $25. The
annual holding rate I is 2% and the holding
cost for each unsold magazine at the end of
each month is calculated to be ( 2 % × $ 16 ) / 12
= $0.0267.
Currently, the publisher supplies the magazine
to about 400 major retailers around Hong
Kong (and they will split the orders to other
smaller newsvendors, etc). We categorize
these 400 retailers into three groups: The high
demand, medium demand and low demand
groups, respectively. The demand distributions
for high, medium and low demand groups are
as shown below:
x High ~ N ( 210 ,70 2 ) ,

(17)

x Medium ~ N (60, 202 ) ,

(18)

2

x Low ~ N (15, 5 ) .
(19)
Notice that the uncertainties for all of these
demands are the same in the sense that they
have the same coefficient of variation:
"standard deviation /mean" = 1/3. We also
assume the number of retailers with high,
medium and low demands to be 80 (20%), 240
(60%) and 80 (20%), respectively.
With all these details, we can start our
simulation studies. During the simulation,
demands for retailers following (17), (18) and
(19) are randomly generated and the
corresponding expected profits are found. All

simulation results are obtained after running
simulation experiments for 500 times. For the
case with EMP, the optimal buy-back and the
optimal EMP selling price are found with 1
decimal place of accuracy. In Table 1, we list
the average profits for the publisher, all the
retailers and the supply chain with different
values of buy-back price b under the case
without EMP. Notice that the average profit of
the supply chain is equal to the summation of
the publisher's and retailers' average profits.
Moreover, searching for the optimal buy-back
price which maximizes the publisher's average
profit numerically, we have: b = 11.0 and the
corresponding average profits for the publisher,
the retailers in total and the supply chain are
363447, 234493 and 597940, respectively. By
the way, if we search for the optimal buy-back
price which maximizes the average profit of
the supply chain, we have: b = 14.3 and the
corresponding average profits for the publisher,
the retailers in total and the supply chain are
350805, 262996 and 613801, respectively
Notations:
PAP = Publisher's average profit.
RAP = Retailers' average profit in total.
SAP = Supply-chain's average profit.
CAP = Change of average profit.
%CAP = Percentage change of average profit.
AP = Average profit.
K = 1000 (Kilo).
m = 0.001.
Table 1: The average profits of the publisher,
retailers and the supply chain with different
buy-back price b when there is no EMP.
b
PAP
RAP
SAP
0.01
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
15.9

342261
344564
346909
349262
351606
353916
356154
358274
360203
361835
363004
363447
362734
360084
353864
339642
295209

189921
192609
195492
198563
201851
205383
209187
213315
217826
222793
228306
234493
241549
249761
259605
272047
287934

532182
537173
542401
547825
553457
559299
565341
571589
578029
584628
591310
597940
604283
609845
613469
611689
583143

Findings 1: (From Table 1)
1. In Table 1, we can observe that when
the buy-back price increases, the total
retailers' average profit increases. It
meets our intuition as the retailers can
return their products with a nicer
return price.
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2.

In the case without EMP, the
publisher's optimal buy-back price
3. (11.0) is not equal to the supply
chain's optimal buy-back price (which
we have found to be 14.3). It means
that the supply chain is not optimal
and double marginalization occurs.
This is due to the fact that there is no
coordination and integration between
the publisher and the retailers in our
model.
Now, we consider the use of e-marketplace.
Following (2) and (3), suppose the emarketplace has the following price-dependent
demand structure for all 12 ≤ rEMP ≤ 25 (P.S:
Here, we only consider the values of rEMP
which range from about 50% to 100% of the
retail market price):
2
x EMP ~ N (− K1rEMP + K 2 , σEMP
) , (20)

where rEMP is the unit product's selling price
via the e-marketplace and K 1 , K 2 , σ EMP are
all known constants. Moreover, notice that
rEMP is bounded while x EMP is a normally
distributed random variable which is not wellbounded. In order to study the effect of high
and low demand in the e-marketplace, we
carried out simulation experiments with
different values of these parameters while we
have kept the coefficient of variation (standard
deviation/mean) fixed. Tables 2.1, 2.2, …, 2.6
show the optimal buy-back price with different
values of rEMP and the corresponding average
profits for the publisher, the retailers and the
supply chain. Notice that we have not included
the fixed operations cost of the EMP in the
simulation results.
*
Table 2.1: With Case 1 distribution, the bEMP
+

and the average profits for given rEMP .
Case 1:
x EMP ~ N ( −300 rEMP + 12000 , 2400 2 )
rEMP
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

*
EMP+

b

13.5
13.5
13.5
13.4
13.4
13.3
13.2
13.1
13.0
12.9
12.7
12.7
12.5
12.5

PAP

RAP

SAP

452269
457279
461716
465602
468920
471651
473787
475324
476266
476621
476365
475525
474129
472156

254436
254436
254436
253464
253464
252512
251577
250661
249761
248878
247156
247156
245489
245489

706705
711715
716152
719066
722384
724163
725364
725985
726027
725499
723521
722681
719618
717645

*
Table 2.2: With Case 2 distribution, the bEMP
+
and the average profits for given rEMP .

Case 2: x EMP ~ N ( − 250 rEMP + 10000 , 2000 2 )
rEMP

*
bEMP
+

PAP

RAP

SAP

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

12.9
12.9
12.8
12.7
12.6
12.6
12.5
12.4
12.3
12.2
12.0
12.0
11.9
11.8

441050
445149
448782
451907
454534
456654
458272
459391
460015
460137
459749
458861
457518
455719

248878
248878
248010
247156
246315
246315
245489
244676
243876
243088
241549
241549
240796
240054

689928
694027
696792
699063
700849
702969
703761
704067
703891
703225
701298
700410
698314
695773

*
Table 2.3: With Case 3 distribution, the bEMP
+

and the average profits for given rEMP .
Case 3: x EMP ~ N (−200 r EMP + 8000, 16002 )
rEMP

*
bEMP
+

PAP

RAP

SAP

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

12.1
12.0
11.9
11.9
11.8
11.7
11.6
11.6
11.5
11.5
11.4
11.4
11.4
11.3

428293
431463
434228
436582
438530
440066
441199
441934
442279
442236
441797
440973
439786
438252

242313
241549
240796
240796
240054
239324
238605
238605
237896
237896
237196
237196
237196
236507

670606
673012
675024
677378
678584
679390
679804
680539
680175
680132
678993
678169
676982
674759

*
Table 2.4: With Case 4 distribution, the bEMP
+

and the average profits for given rEMP .
Case 4: x EMP ~ N (−150rEMP + 6000, 12002 )
rEMP

*
bEMP
+

PAP

RAP

SAP

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

11.2
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.1
11.1
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0

413387
415662
417632
419306
420684
421744
422543
423015
423196
423084
422681
421990
421033
419812

235827
235827
235827
235827
235827
235155
235155
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493

649214
651489
653459
655133
656511
656899
657698
657508
657689
657577
657174
656483
655526
654305
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back price is always larger than or at least
equal to the optimal buy-back price
without the e-marketplace. Moreover, the
lower the EMP demand, the smaller the
difference between the optimal buy-back
prices with and without EMP. It can be
explained by the fact that the smaller the
EMP demand, the less amount of products
required to satisfy it and hence the smaller
incentive of the publisher to increase the
buy-back price to attract the retailers to
order more (and probably return more ).
With the same argument, on the other
hand, the larger the demand in the EMP,
the larger the optimal buy-back price and
a higher buy-back price can help the
publisher in two ways: i. The publisher
can entice the retailers to order more
during the normal selling season. ii. With
a larger buy-back price, the expected
amount of returned products should
increase. Since the EMP demand is large,
the increased amount of returned products
can be used to fulfill the potential demand
in the EMP.
On the other hand, observe that the
findings in Findings 1 still hold in the
cases with EMP as reflected in Tables 2.1
to 2.6.

*
Table 2.5: With Case 5 distribution, the bEMP
+
and the average profits for given rEMP .

Case 5: x EMP ~ N (−100rEMP + 4000, 800 2 )
rEMP

*
bEMP
+

PAP

RAP

SAP

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0

396899
398391
399683
400776
401671
402367
402864
403167
403279
403187
402915
402465
401826
401012

234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493

631392
632884
634176
635269
636164
636860
637357
637660
637772
637680
637408
636958
636319
635505

*
Table 2.6: With Case 6 distribution, the bEMP
+

and the average profits for given rEMP .
Case 6: x EMP ~ N (−50rEMP + 2000, 4002 )
rEMP

*
bEMP
+

PAP

RAP

SAP

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0

380156
380902
381549
382095
382542
382890
383139
383290
383346
383306
383170
382939
382620
382213

234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493
234493

614649
615395
616042
616588
617035
617383
617632
617783
617839
617799
617663
617432
617113
616706

Findings 2: (From Tables 2.1 to 2.6)
1. From Tables 2.1 to 2.6, we find that the
optimal buy-back prices depend heavily
on the demand size of the EMP. In Cases
1 to 3, we have relatively large EMP
demand and the optimal buy-back price
with EMP is larger than the optimal buyback
price
without
EMP,
i.e.
*
*
bEMP+ > bEMP− . In Case 4, when the EMP
demand is in a moderate size, the optimal
buy-back prices under the cases with and
without EMP are very close to one another:
*
*
bEMP
+ ≈ bEMP− . When the EMP demand
takes a relatively small value which occurs
in Cases 5 and 6, the optimal buy-back
price with EMP equals the optimal buy*
*
back price without EMP, bEMP
+ = bEMP− .
Thus, we know that with the introduction
of the e-marketplace, the optimal buy-

2.

With Tables 2.1 to 2.6, we can search for the
*
*
optimal values of r EMP
and bEMP
+ . Table 3
summarizes the optimal buy-back price and
EMP selling price pair for each demand case.
Compared with the case without using the
EMP, the percentage changes of the average
profits when the publisher adopts the EMP are
shown in Table 4.

*
*
Table 3: The optimal pair: r EMP
and bEMP
+
and the average profits under Cases 1 to 6.
*
*
Case r EMP
PAP RAP SAP
bEMP

1
2
3
4
5
6

21.0
20.7
20.4
20.2
20.0
20.0

12.9
12.2
11.5
11.0
11.0
11.0

476621
460157
442309
423198
403279
383466

248878
243088
237896
234493
234493
234493

725499
703245
680205
657691
637772
617959

Table 4: The changes and the % changes of
the average profits with the use of EMP under
Cases 1 to 6.
Publisher's
Retailers'
Supply
Chain's
Case CAP %CAP CAP %CAP CAP %CAP
1
2
3
4
5
6

113174
96710
78862
59751
39832
20019

31.14% 14385 6.13% 127559 21.33%
26.61% 8595 3.67% 105305 17.61%
21.70% 3403 1.45% 82265 13.76%
16.44% 0
0.00% 59751 9.99%
10.96% 0
0.00% 39832 6.66%
5.51%
0
0.00% 20019 3.35%
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Findings 3: (Tables 3 and 4)
From Tables 3 and 4, we can observe that the
average profits of the publisher, retailers in
total and the overall supply chain all get
improved or at least not worse than before
after using the EMP. When the EMP demand
is relatively large (in Cases 1 to 3), the average
profits for the publisher, retailers and the
supply chain all get improved. This is due to
the increase of the optimal buy-back price.
When the EMP demand is relatively small (in
Cases 4 to 5), there is no improvement in terms
of the average profit for the retailers and the
amount of improvement for the publisher and
also the overall supply chain will be relatively
small. Thus, for the retailers, they can actually
be benefited if the EMP demand is large. In
fact, we find that the larger the EMP demand,
the larger the improvement of the average
profits for all parties. Moreover, when the
fixed operations cost of the EMP is less than
the publisher's improvement of average profit,
the publisher should be willing to proceed.
Notice that when the demand follows the
distribution in Case 6, the amount of
improvement for the publisher is only 20019,
which is pretty small. Thus, the expected
improvement of profit with the EMP is not
necessarily attractive and it depends highly on
the demand in the EMP. Since the demand on
Internet is highly volatile, the risk of operating
the EMP is high. As a result, unless the
publisher is rather certain about the existence
of a sufficiently large demand from the EMP,
proceeding with the EMP may not be a smart
decision. It also explains the situation that
EMP for the publishing industry is not that
popular in many places (e.g. in Hong Kong)
because the EMP demand is still relatively
small and uncertain.
Next, we carry out numerical analysis towards
several parameters of the EMP. Notice that
according to (20), the EMP demand ( x EMP )
distributes as a normal distribution with mean
2
of − K1 rEMP + K 2 and variance of σ EMP
. We
would like to look into the impact of the
variation of each of the parameters for the
distribution of x EMP . Moreover, we would also
check about the impact of the holding cost for
the EMP. As a control setting, we will set our
default EMP demand to be the one used in
Case
3
above,
i.e.
x EMP ~ N (−200rEMP + 8000, 16002 ) . Then we
will change each of the parameters for this
EMP demand and investigate its impact. The
numerical results for the analysis are as shown
in Tables 5 to 8 below.

*
Table 5: Effect of the changes in K 1 to r EMP
*
and bEMP
and the corresponding average
profits' changes with EMP.
Publisher's
Total
Supply
*
K 1 r EMP
b *EMP
Retailers' Chain's
% CAP
% CAP % CAP

50
100
200
300

25
25
20.4
13.6

13.0
12.3
11.5
11.3

44.70%
36.88%
21.70%
14.45%

6.51%
4.00%
1.45%
0.86%

29.73%
23.99%
13.76%
9.12%

*
Table 6: Effect of the changes in K 2 to r EMP
*
and bEMP
and the corresponding average
profits' changes with EMP.
Publisher's
Total
Supply
*
K 2 r EMP
b *EMP
Retailers' Chain's
% CAP
% CAP % CAP

6K
8K
10K
12K

15.4
20.4
25
25

11.2
11.5
12.1
13.1

12.35%
21.70%
33.66%
46.24%

0.57%
1.45%
3.33%
6.89%

7.73%
13.76%
21.77%
30.81%

Table 7: Effect of the changes in σ EMP to
*
*
r EMP
and bEMP
and the corresponding

σ EMP

average profits' changes with EMP.
Publisher's
Total
Supply
*
r EMP
b *EMP
Retailers' Chain's
% CAP
% CAP % CAP

400
800
1.6K
3.2K

19.9
20.0
20.4
22.5

11.0
11.0
11.5
12.4

21.97%
21.95%
21.70%
21.53%

0.00%
0.00%
1.45%
4.34%

13.36%
13.34%
13.76%
14.79%

*
Table 8: Effect of the changes in h EMP to r EMP
*
and bEMP
and the corresponding average
profits' changes with EMP.
Publisher's
Total
Supply
*
hEMP r *
b
Retailers'
Chain's
EMP
EMP
% CAP
% CAP % CAP

2m
5m
0.01
0.1
1

20.4
20.4
20.4
20.3
20.1

11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.1

21.70%
21.70%
21.69%
21.62%
20.90%

1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
0.28%

13.76%
13.76%
13.76%
13.71%
12.81%

Findings 4: (Tables 5 to 8)
1.

*
When K 1 increases, both r EMP
and
*
bEMP
decrease. The average profits

for all parties also decrease: The
decrease of average profits is a very
intuitive result because the larger the
value of K 1 , the smaller the mean of
the EMP demand and it implies a
smaller profit from the EMP for the
publisher. Moreover, since the
expected EMP demand is reduced, the
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publisher need not increase the
optimal buy-back price and it
accounts for a loss for the retailers.
Moreover, when K 1 increases, the
effect of price change will become
more prominent and it explains why
the optimal EM P selling price
decreases upon the increase of K 1 .
2.

*
When K 2 increases, both r EMP
and
*
bEMP
increase. The average profits

for all parties also increase: K 2 is the
constant term for the mean of the
EMP demand. An increased K 2
implies a larger expected EMP
demand and it makes the optimal buy*
back price bEMP
and all the average
profits increase. On the other hand,
similar to the comment we have made
in Point 1 above, when K 2 increases,

the relative significance of K 1
decreases and the EMP demand is
less sensitive to the price changes. An
*
increased r EMP
hence results.

3.

When

2
*
σ EMP
increases, both r EMP

*
and bEMP
increase. The publisher's
average profit is reduced while the
retailers' average profit increases:
Since the supply chain's average
profit is affected by the average
profits of the retailers and the
publisher, the effect of increasing
2
σ EMP
may increase or decrease the
supply chain's average profit. This is
an interesting finding. First of all, an
2
increased σ EMP
implies an increased
EMP demand uncertainty. When the
uncertainty increases, in order to
maximize the profit for the EMP, the
publisher tends to hold more returned
products (P.S: The concept of safety
stock inventory). As a result, the
optimal buy-back increases. An
increased demand uncertainty also
implies a drop in the significance of
the mean of the demand. This gives a
*
larger r EMP
.

4.

When h EMP varies, the effect to the
*
optimal solution pair of r EMP
and
*
bEMP
is very small. The impact for

the average profits for all parties is
small too. Thus, when the EMP
holding cost h EMP is within
reasonable range, its effect is to all
the parties is small.

Other Discussions:
In the system point of view, the introduction of
the EMP in this example is beneficial (or at
least not harmful) to the publisher, the retailers
and also the whole supply chain when the
profit generated is larger than the expense of
operating the EMP for the publisher **. In fact,
the use of EMP in the setting proposed in this
paper can be beneficial and is never harmful to
the retailers. Owing to the potential demand
from the EMP, the publisher will increase the
buy-back price offered to the retailers, when
every other cost parameter remains constant. It
is obvious that the higher the buy-back price,
the higher the expected profit for the retailers.
As a result, if the use of EMP is beneficial to
the publisher (e.g. the net expected profit
improvement overrides the fixed operations
cost) and the publisher goes ahead with it, the
retailers can also be benefited. This creates a
win-win situation and the overall supply
chain’s expected profit is also improved.
**Remarks: We have assumed in this paper
that the existence of EMP does not affect the
market demand during the normal selling
season for the retailers. Although we have
explained about this point earlier in this paper,
if the existence of EMP does affect the
demands faced by the retailers, then the
existence of EMP will give both a positive
impact (potential increase of buy-back price
from the publisher) and negative impact (lower
demand) to the retailers. As a result, whether
the retailers will get better off or not depends
on the relative significance between these two
issues.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a quantitative
supply chain management model for using the
e-marketplace to sell returned products in the
publishing industry. We illustrate the
application of the buy-back return policy and
through the simulation studies towards a local
publisher's case, we discuss the managerial and
strategic issues of using the e-marketplace. In
our model, we find that the introduction of the
e-marketplace can be beneficial to the retailers
and whether the publisher and the overall
supply chain is benefited depends on his fixed
operations cost and the demand in the emarketplace. For the e-marketplace with
moderate and large demand, we find that the
improvement of expected profits for the
publisher, the retailers and also the supply
chain can be substantial. Owing to the fact that
Internet targets at a global market without
geographical barrier, the potential demand for
those “locally fade-out” products can be high.
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As a result, the importance of using Internet as
an e-marketplace for returned products should
not be neglected and it can yield significant
improvement on the profit for the existing
supply chains.
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